The intramundane horizont

 

The Intramundane Horizont

©By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

  

Alive present is the ultimate, universal and absolute form of the transcendental experience in general

Jacques Derrida

Form and Wishes to Say, Notes on the Phenomenology of language

   Written in English and translated to English 

by Abdel Hernandez San Juan

  Why not simply to accept the worlds of life in its wordless occur as it happens in our ordinary decurse between the whole of the activities we develop as individuals under the pragmatics of daily life between day and nights?

   Infinity motives internals to our life decurse turn our attention to the world of life without yet a question on research or knowledge, this ways to assure and turn our attention to it are implicits to the internal rationality and needs the world of life supposes

  In the world of life occur our life style, we enjoy under it life alones and accompanied at the same time under it we made activities oriented to our practical ends evolving our affective and intersubjective relations and communications as well as our professional and economic activities

  But the worlds of life suppose countless more things than what we usually assure on in an ordinary sense and the need to go beyond in this comprehension is addressed to enrich our knowledge’s so as to increase the potential of such assure toward enriching the possibilities of both to our ends under it as well as to best known, to understand how it provide us with new cutts to epistemology on how the production of knowledge work thanks to it in a differentiated mode uniques to world of life encompassing  questions on how concepts must work and its relations in between

   It is not equal a form of knowledge seen as something out of the world immersed in the mere desfamiliarized universe of pure abstraction than a knowledge obtained from the pragmatical universe that engage our senses with practical horizonts. I will thus as follow propose a series of concepts I have developed as result of my own assures on the worlds of life

   The first simple phenomenological concept to afford it is my concept of an enveloped world needed to understand how a world is phenomenologically feel in subjectivity and the body within the world of life.

    If we made an struggle, an effort to assure in our world of life taking a certain distance to it attaining to define it immediately we observe that our habit tendency is to site in the horizont of our gaze, of our visual attention, a whole of physical spaces, of locations, sites and places in which our things decurse

   This places, sites, locations, spaces of habitat evolve home, the house we live and the places we usually visit daily such as our job building during the week, the places we visit to entertainment, recreation and markets consume weklee or monthly, universes of interactions and communication evolving activities we develop around our pleasures, our needs and communications, going to shopping, cooking, reading, writing, communicating with other persons, paying attention to family members and friends, taking a rest, etc

  However, as soon as we unfold in the visual imagination or the fancy this succession of locations, sites, activities and exchanges with persons we assure that such an unfold we have made outer, is not coincident with the mode we experience, life and feel it in our subjectivity and the impressions of our bodies, meaning that unfolding visually a succession of places exteriorized as sites and locations, is itself an inusual way to exteriorize e nevera use inside the world of life as we experience it both sensorially and in terms of our subjectivity.  All this things in fact, consideres as experience are full and plenty of sense to us and as such a living room, a market place, a coart yard, an office, a recreation site, adquiere to us senses and meanings far to exterioruzing it as a list of things distributed as exteriorized to our body and subjectivity

  The enveloped character of the worlds of life suppose instead deep and profound issues in phenomenology and hermeneutic. Both points of view -- phenomenology and hermeneutic-- light be comprehended in relatibly independent modes but at the end both are narrow related one into the other

   The more exterior concept and however internal to the enveloped form of the world of life e have is the concept of pertinence, we might even say that pertinence order the enveloped nature of lifé world providing to it a common sense texere, pertinences indeed organize and provide word of life its wordless plot, worlds of life are pertinents

    I have called this concept of exteriority phenomenologically so as to negate the impression of the list of exteriorized things, thus that the world of life are instead enveloped, folded, surrounded, hence, this may probably give the impression of something excesibly interiorist and subjective so as subordinated only to individual liveness as a way to return to a kind of interiorism

  Well, the enveloped nature of the world of life certainly evolve a certain interiority and subjectivism to experience ordered according to liveness under the alive present but as such it evolve also  the making of sense to persons among their intersubjective communication, in this sense, by the same motive, the world of life as a mundane universe is articulated according to lonely self-monologue and intersubjective communications experienced under the pragmatics of everyday life and as such the idea of a full interiority or subjectivity is insufficient

  As a closing introductory statement this fold of a first exteriority defined by pertinence is pivotal, pertinence organize the world of common sense, it distribute and made possible the adequate way to seize how exteriority must be understand to sense, subjectivity and bodies under the world of life, meaning, that pertinence explicit how a world must be phenomenologically an enveloped world which mean to subjectivity something internal while it have an adequate way to understand how externality make sense under it

  In a few words, pertinence organize the genesis of the structure of common sense, it is what provides common sense with an structure, it is in fact at the core of the sense organize the structural genesis of common sense in a phenomenological level and as such guaranty the enveloped character of life world, its structures

Pertinences, however, being the adequate mode of exteriority correspond to the enveloped nature of life world, although overline the fold of this first or proximity exteriority, contiguous and at the same time interior to the sense in respect to how we experience it, are inclusive to the anticipations of enunciations of explicitation as to the acts and actions of the pragmatics of the life world thus providing that nature of worldneess inclusive to our activities and communications giving to it structural stability of common sense, but are not sufficients, life worlds in fact are enveloped worlds by countless another reasons and phenomenological motives

  Here we have first the monadic nature of any experience and liveness phenomenologically, first, the interior and the exterior, or internal and external, second, the one and the multiple, one self and the distinct, the itself of one selves and the it selves of any one presented to the one of one selves as otherness or alterity, as the multiplicity of many ones, meaning the monad as the single one with its own interiority from which like a church, the body and its impressions, the single one process the exterior world in subjectivity, the experience of the liveness world always from the phenomenological interior of the body sensations and impressions in regard to its outsides, the fall out of each monad and the confirmation that all the other monads experience it in a similar form

  ´The monadic character of experience and liveness is in the center of the enveloped nature of the life worlds. Without monad the idea and the feeling of the idea of world itself is impossible. The monad overline and confirm being the fold of the interior and the exterior, the adequate mode in which a world is experienced and liveness by the person, that is which confirm a world to subjectivity, impressions and sensations, can’t be a world without a monad, might probably be another thing, maybe reality, but never a world

  In the idea of world the subject and the object meet, without subjectivity objectivity can’t be reproduced, can’t have a continuity, permanence and stability and in reverse, without objectivity subjectivity can’t have nothing of it as well. At the same time the monad confirms, we have already above discussed it with pertinence, the modes of exteriority adequate to experience and liveness and in reverse the modes of interiority adequate to the forms of exteriority, we have seen it above with our example of a list of distributed places and sites

   Monad is decisive to understanding the enveloped folded character of the life world at the phenomenological level and although less at the hermeneutical level since hermeneutic is itself less monadic than phenomenology, it continues helping with some needed comprehension at the hermeneutical level as well so that the monad is major phenomenologically while complimentary hermeneutically not without saying again that the idea of world is fully monadic

  Experience is the main concept of the life world, from experience and returning to experience everything goes and happen, but the life worlds are also full of activities and communications, decursive falls out related with purely mundane and ordinary experience thus fully immerse in the pragmatics of everyday life

   I will discuss experience further since it is best known while I will instead try to attempt and attain more in proposing and focusing my concept of the intramundane horizont

   With this concept of The intramundane horizont the phenomenological and hermeneutic aspects of the life world start to relates, communicative activities of diverse types, individually expressive or intersubjective mix with the world of life and its pragmatics developing the intramundane nature of the life world

  In fact, life world considered only phenomenologically although are enveloped worlds and worlds itself are not yet however intramundane, the intramundane nature of the worlds of life start to be as such according to various forms through which hermeneutic start to be a part in life world and mix or fusion in several forms with its phenomenological form.

  A world phenomenologically considered is already a world to subjectivity, the body and sensoriality, the feeling indeed of something as a world is in fact something phenomenological, but seen as such it is not yet an intramundane world, to be intramundane the world need to be plenty in hermeneutics

   We need at this point to do some distinctions between phenomenology and hermeneutic as to understanding its differences to later comply how a relation in between must mix and be encompassed

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   Phenomenology might be very abstract or concrete and empiric, we can do for example a phenomenology of the spirit as hegel did around concience when nothing as an objetive external reality is considered or we can do phenomenological analysis of very concrete things

  For example, the last one might be the case of the phenomenological study of a work of art, we can know more or less on the author conscience, motivations and intentionality but if we don’t know on it since we don’t have access, we instead use or knowledge on how a conscience in general according to our experience must relate things as such, meaning as in that oncrete work of art we have in front our gaze as to infer how things, objects and signs are relate as such, in doing so we must thus do a phenomenological analysis of it

   In regard to the first example we can mention the Kant a priories, in fact, we know nothing on the a priories according to empirical experience, nothing as the a priories are in fact distinguished and separated within experience and however, a soon as the abstraction of concepts brings us through the purity of logical analysis to the fact that from intuition there is a different  prioristic pattern and parameters to practical reason in comparison to aesthetics judgements and to pure reason, we realice its true, albeit nothing in experience confirm it, we recognize that certainly it is a need to separe aesthetic reason, from practical reason and both from pure reason not only to best understand each one in its own purity, in its own consistency but even also to practice it

  Finally, phenomenology allows us to leads the analysis from the appearance of something which we perceive as it made presence to our senses and sensoriality in front of us, as a phenomenic, as form, as appearance, to further advance to the stratus

  Within hermeneutic our procedure is distinct, there is nothing in hermeneutic as to made abstraction of concepts in its purity, nothing as to recognize how the conscience give forms to something and nothing as advancing from appearance to essence, but another kind of procedures, through hermeneutic we should make sense of something, we must interpret, elucidate and make something explicit and intelligible, it is about sense and interpretation and encompass from interpreting texts to understanding others, to make sense of things

   With this say we understand that the enveloped and folded nature of life world at the phenomenological level evolve the relation of our sensations and subjectivity impressions of a world, monadic in respect to the body, pertinent in respect to its structures, definid by a sense distinción between the internal and the external and the surroundings of it, but this world phenomenologically considered is not yet an intramundane world, to be intramundane, such as world must include hermeneutically senses and interpretations, elucidations and explicitations

   In doing so by mixing understanding a world as both phenomenology and hermeneutic we get and obtain, we at least understand how the intramundane world and horizont take shape and grow, in a few words, not matter how important must be our confirmation of the world to subjectivity and body sensations, it will never be an intramundane world without hermeneutic, without hermeneutic nothing as an intramundane horizont is possible, it may probably be a phenomenological world but not an intramundane one as well as with only hermeneutic we must probably speak of mundane things while never to experience it as a world, we say in fact horizont just to accent that as soon as hermeneutic entrance to be fusion with phenomenology, that world become at the same time a horizont

  Moreover hermeneutic as a form of giving sense plot the world of life transforming it in a plenty universe of sense, explicitation and communication which participate in the definition itself of the practice of everyday life and its pragmatics

  It is required to advance here the comprehension that hermeneutic is not including here the relation between the exegesis and a text but only the process of elucidation and explicitation evolved in the making sense of our experience inside the pragmatics of everyday life

  Without doubt the intramundane nature of the life words is composed by activities of intersubjective communication between persons and speakers through the exchanges of enunciations, but not only of that, in the worlds of life only the activity we made and performance between day and nights are plenty of hermeneutic within our monologues alones too, it is evolved from the moment we choice to give form to our days, in giving sense to what we live, in returning to what we experience through memory and or selfexplicitations as we realize to interpret and elucidate the sense of the experienced and the ways to relate it with our nexts activities and choosings.

   Phenomenologically we comply our impressions, our gaze, environments and spaces as an enveloped worlds but to include the pragmatics of everyday life and intersubjectivity so as to comply such a World now considered as intramundane we leed a sense plenty of hermeneutics

  In a few words, hermeneutic become internal to our practice, the practice of everyday life supposes in the succession of activities the modes how through hermeneutics we discern and plot the intramundane horizont, what are we doing now?, what we will be doing later?, what relates one activity to another one?, so our ends, etc, all that is full of hermeneutic elucidations internally and participates as forms of given sense in the pragmatiques of life

   Besides that, intersubjective communications are of major importance in that which define the intramundane horizont. 

  The first concept that appear as decisive at the intramundane level with it ritual repetitive nature is my concept I would like to propose here of "share spectations horizonts". To understand "share spectations Horizont" we need to understand that enunciations as forms of communication seen from the pragmatiques of daily life can’t be isolated or set aside as forms of discourse or separated from that pragmatiques as forms of the messages, the text or a discourse, we are not speaking here of language understand as an emission of a communication acquire a form of the phrase or a sentence written or speech, neither teletransmited about which those who exchange enunciates are emisors and receptors, differently to this semiotic comprehension of communication which often subordinates the pragmatic of communication to the pragmatique of information and overall of the transmitted text to be considered by its own structure is out of play here, in the pragmatiques of everyday life the enunciations at intersubjective communications level are modes of explicitation and intelligibility

   Pertinence as what give structure to common sense in the enveloped folded nature of life world leads here us our choices, our selections as well as to our ways of discard, It allow us to distinguish what forms of enunciations correspond adequately to the enveloped nature of the worlds of life establishing the separation of that which belong to the phenomenology and hermeneutic of the worlds of life and that which give stability and continuity to pragmatics logics under the ordinary becoming’s and as what prepare how under intersubjective relations share spectations horizonts are arranged projecting its nexts. The nexts are here forms of the immediacy, we all know the relation between pragmatism and contingency, the pragmatics of daily life are immediacies contingents to life world

  As example let consider a teletransmited message, this message might be of course copy, cutted and pasted in a file as well as analyzed as phrase by its discourse autonomy, but this analysis is impertinent to what an email is in terms of the life world pertinence exchanges of enunciations at intramundane conditions. The same must be sustained about a phone call, we might take distance and assure of it observing it as a form of text and discourse, we may even record it and print it as to be read an analyzed but such a behavior and distance is impertinent to what a phone call mean to those who exchange phones enunciations within the intramundane Horizont.

  The separations and isolation of discourse as text is seldom and rare It is far to belong or pertain to what sound enunciations means under the forms to make sense of it as explicitations and elucidations of sense between mundane ordinary speakers, all that being say under phone dialogues is evolved and enveloped within phenomenological and hermeneutical forms of live contingencies, experiences and practices ruled by elucidating sense, doing so in fact is a lack of sense, a form to lost the sense enunciations have under such a phenomenological and hermeneutical situation, let note that the relation here is not between interpretation and a text, but hermeneutical at the ontological level of sense elucidation, something is being elucidated so as to make it explicit the exchange of enunciations and as to stablish the contingency of the nexts pragmatiques

   This is not a way to say that elucidations of sense scape from a more or less levels of interpretation, but if a form of enunciation is not explicit in life world from the moment it is not making sense, the entrance to be a part of the share spectations horizonts is discarded, share spectations horizonts results from enunciative explicitations and interpretative arranges as it define what must be included and be successive in the pragmatics of the life world

    Only when interpretative arranges arises and source from intelligible explicitations share spectations horizonts star to taje shape, the practical relation between enunciations of explicitations and life world stablishes the nexts of the immediacies determining what will be successive and continuity to be part in life world

   Obviously not everything stays to be successive in the worlds of life, the non-explicit modes of enunciation are discarded by the relation itself between sense and pragmatics of life world. The senses of enunciations in the intersubjective pragmatics of life world are necessarily intelligible explicitations, if it is not adequate to the principles of mutual explicitations and if share spectations horizonts are not the results of it as belonging to hermeneutic arranges, it is discarded and excluded from life world, with great facility and easily a form of enunciation is excluded from the pragmatics of daily life world.

   I might be excluded and discarded because it demand a mode of relation to the enunciations inadequate to the pragmatics life world suppose temporality and spatially or it may be excluded because it is isolated in an universe inadequate to the practical dimension of life world pragmatics, this pragmatics are mainly the consequences of interpretative arranges around which share spectations horizonts source it belong to explicitations and elucidations of senses at the level of enunciations

  A world of life is a continuum alive present, a discrete and measurable universe of wordless sense constrained by phenomenological impressions to the body, sensations and subjectivity, the so-called discussed above principles to which the idea itself of a world belong and the mix with it of hermeneutic at the ontological level of the making of sense of experience leads us both to our monologues as well as under intersubjective forms of communication

    Under the enveloped nature of the worlds of life enunciations and phrases are nothing else but intelligible explicitations, each enunciation is oriented since it source and arise, since it take shape and form, from mutual explicitations, mutuality is here constitutive of the order of the enunciative modes, in fact, the intramundane horizonts is nothing else than the result of It both alones under our mologues from which we made sense of our own experiences toward the nexts by which we reorder daily our ends, and under intersubjective forms of mutual explicitations. 

  The Intramundane horizont is in a few words a conjunction of arranges of senses and meanings, interpretative and hermeneutical arranges which results from self-explicitations of experience elucidations of sense, and or from mutual explicitations between speaker’s enunciations exchanges based in elucidations of sense, share spectations horizonts are thus the hermeneutic form of the intramundane horizont both individually and intersubjetibly

  Share spectations horizonts are indeed open forms of understanding established around mutual explicitations which creates intramundane spectatives of pragmatic continuity and stability to the life world nexts and successions

  We say that share spectations horizonts are open forms of understanding because nothing as a closed meaning must be guaranty at the interpretative level, the speaker or reflexive subject is always on his own side making his own sense to both experience and enunciations, nothing as to control the openness of each one interpretation might be guaranty, but at the same time, nothing as a pragmatic of practical endeavors of communication as clear as to decide the nexts and successions of our own activities alones or accompany might be sustained without making of sense by elucidating experience, in fact, the pragmatic itself is the result and belong to mutual explicitations as explicitation is the consequence of sense elucidation

   In this sense we say open as a way to say letting it go under the horizont of upcoming communications as communications are itself articulated pragmatically in the life world, interpretative arranges are not final meanings, but arranges as the word suggest it, arranges of elucidations of sense and explicitations as such  modes of adecuation, the rationality of communication is contingent to life world, this is not consensus, but beyond consensus, all indeed truly needed are hermeneutical arranges and share spectations horizonts

   If an interpretation is not adequate to the relations of mutual explicitation sake share spectations horizonts with its intersubjective arranges as open forms of understanding it is excluded from the nexts in the life pragmatics

  This exclusion of course is made by the monad which is what phenomenologically confirm a whole to the body impression, sense of inside and outside and to subjectivity. Share spectations Horizonts replace here consensus, nothing as consensus is needed here around something but simply hermeneutic arranges resulting from mutual explicitations as to set in perspective the spectative horizonts around which explicitations and elucidations endowed the senses of the intramundane horizont. As discussed above this is not about consensus between forms of enunciation according to what the enunciations say but about the consensus on communicative rationality as the form of relation

   Beyond even that in the enveloped folded phenomenological and hermeneutic nature of life world, explicitations in the intramundane horizont stablish relations to the practical order which seldom and not always indeed are discerned around the contents of the said and enunciations but instead around what relates such enunciations with the practical dimension

  The open dimension of understanding stablishes here intramundane hermeneutical relations parts of the life world received and welcome by life world and projected under it the next and decurse of successive activities. The motivations of the participants, of those who exchange and of speakers, entail with the open dimension of understanding as result of mutual explicitations of the enunciative modes, the relation between motivations and adecuations replace the relation between interpretations and texts, hermeneutic as what indeed endowed sense set in perspective intramundane horizonts of spectatives this horizonts are hermeneutically itself as narrow related with life worlds in its both forms, phenomenologically and hermeneutically.

  Bibliography

Habermas Junger, The Theory of Communicative Action 1 and 2, First Manuscript Version, The Library of the University of Visual Art Armando Reveron, Caracas

Habermas Junger, The Problem of Comprehension in Social Sciences, Volume 1-Reason and the Rationalization of Society, Boston, Beacon Press. 

Habermas Junger, La Problemática de la Comprensión en Ciencias Sociales, Pp, 144-196, Teoría de la Acción Comunicativa I y II, Taurus

Schütz Alfred, El Conocimiento en los Mundos de la Vida Cotidiana, edited by Schutz wife Ilse Heim with Thomas Luckmann